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In response to the strategically planned and increasingly 
deadly globalization of U.S. led neoliberal transnational 
corporate capitalism as well as of its neoconservative 
covert and overt acts of espionage and wars for regime-
change and empire[1], this essay raises the question of the 
contemporary meaning and relevancy of a depreciated 
concept that for most of the 20th and now 21st centuries 
has been relegated to the trash heap of history as being 
anachronistic and thus, worthless for addressing the 
increasing crises of modernity.  This disdained and all but 
forgotten concept is utopia: that future-oriented, religious 
and/or secular expression of a society so organized as to put to an end to the horror of 
humanity’s pre-history through the production and reproduction of itself in all of its 
structures for the well-being and happiness of all its people, as well as that of nature. As 
such, utopic thinking is expressive of the humanistic and humanizing longing that has the 
potential of creating a historically grounded, revolutionary theory and praxis for that 
which is “not-yet,” for that which is “other” if not the religiously conceived totally 
“Other” – the new creation of God – than the globally metastasizing systems of 
domination, exploitation, suffering and death.  Because of its revolutionary potential, 
especially in the midst of the contemporary globalization of Western capitalist “interests” 
and the corollary of military domination, the notion of utopia has been devalued 
strategically to the realm of culture in the forms of science fiction, video games, and/or 
narrative apocalyptic projections of the historically experienced horrors of class warfare, 
experienced particularly in the lives of the oppressed masses, into its consummation in a 
totally administered, instrumentalized, cybernetic, “iron cage” [Horkheimer & Adorno 
1972; Adorno 1973, 1974, 2008; Marcuse 1964; Weber 1958:181] future society – a dys- 
or cacotopia.[2] As an expression of resistance and alternative to this strategic historical 
and systemic debasement of the critical and liberating potential of utopic thinking and 
concrete action, this study addresses the dialectic of the religious and secular 
complexities of utopic thought and of its relevancy in any revolutionary struggle for a 
more reconciled and humanistic future global totality. The focus for this study is on the 
theoretical work on this topic by the critical theorist of the Frankfurt School, Theodor W. 
Adorno, and the Marxist philosopher, Ernst Bloch. This paper concludes with a brief 
analysis of Adorno and Bloch’s 1964 public discourse in which they present and defend 
their dialectical theories on utopia. 
Early Utopias: Freedom in Space 
The first use of the word “utopia” has been attributed to Sir/Saint Thomas More, who in 
1516 used it in the title of his book – De optimo rei publicae statu deque nova insula 
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Utopia, which translates literally into English as, “Of a Republic’s Best State and of the 
New Island Utopia.”  However, as the word at least became more common, the book has 
been entitled solely by the name, Utopia [More 2003]. In creating this term, More is said 
to have adapted the Greek word eutopia, meaning “good place”, into outopia or utopia, 
which means “no place” or “no land.” As the first of this utopic genre written in the midst 
of and as an expression of Renaissance Humanism, More’s book is what is called a social 
utopia conceived of being in space, as he situated his good, alternative society to that of 
Europe on an island in the South Sea of the so-called New World.  More’s island Utopia 
was the place of the greatest realization of human freedom and happiness. Utopias of 
freedom in space were depicted as already existing in the present but in some remote part 
of the world.  The utopia already existed; people were just not there yet.  Due to the 
burgeoning exploration of the world via sea travel, made possible by the scientific 
discoveries of navigation, this already existing utopia of freedom in space gave 
expression to the longing of people to move from one place to another in search of a 
better life. This was expressed in More’s description of the main character of his utopia, 
Raphael Hythloday, who is described as having travelled with Amerigo Vespucci in his 
voyages of “discovering” the New World, and then through his own further travels 
arrives at the island of Utopia. 
The content and the particular place of such utopian expression in space changed over the 
centuries according to the vision of the author that was grounded in the existing social 
situation and its possibilities of creating that which was deemed better and/or new.  Thus, 
in the 17th century Tommaso Campenella’s The City of the Sun appeared as the first 
technological utopia; a theocratic, semi-socialistic city situated on a hillside with an ideal 
climate that was protected by seven circles of artistically painted walls in which everyone 
worked for the well-being of all and there was no private property. Unlike More’s focus 
on realizing the greatest human freedom, Campenella’s utopia was an expression of the 
greatest possible normative order for the achievement of a good society. This early 
scientific-technological utopia of space received its greatest expression in 1627 by Sir 
Francis Bacon’s Nova Atlantis; the story of an island in the South Pacific Ocean called 
Bensalem, at the center of which was the “Templum Salomonis” – the ideal, modern 
scientific research university.   Within the paradigm of utopia in space, the utopic content 
changes but the temporal location of utopia thought – be it positively or negatively 
imaged – always remains the same. 
Critique of Capitalism 
These new expressions of Utopia in the Renaissance were a critical response to the 
collapsing conditions of the desperate classes, the peasants, farmers, and the serfs, who 
had to bear the crushing weight of the developing economic transition to early 
capitalism.  As Max Horkheimer [1993:363] states, “the utopians realized that profit was 
becoming the driving force of history in the burgeoning trade economy.”  In anticipation 
of Rousseau’s critique of capitalism, these early utopians understood what was creating 
the increasing misery of the newly created working class: the ownership of private 
property and the pursuit of ever-increasing levels of profit.  As the utopians of the 
Enlightenment, these early utopians understood that it was [and still is] this competitive, 
class pursuit of capital over human well being that was crushing the masses of humanity 
into its service as well as setting the stage for wars between nations. 
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It was no coincidence that in the face of this early development of capitalism both More 
and Campanella, who were Catholics, remained true to the humanizing substance of the 
faith.  For both, it was religion that kept alive the demand for justice and equity in the 
face of human suffering, and in the name of Christ they both advocated for a society in 
which such socially created suffering and oppression no longer existed.  Their utopias 
gave expression to an early communist form of society based on a unified humanity in 
which there was no private property over and against a society governed by the laws of a 
free market.  They envisioned the establishment of such a new, alternative society based 
completely on the appeal to their faith and human reason. 
However, as Horkheimer [1993:367-368] states, “a utopia leaps over time” as it is “the 
dreamland of a historically bound fantasy.” 
Utopianism wants to eliminate the suffering of the present and retain only what is good in 
it.  However, it forgets that these moments of good and evil instances are in reality two 
sides of the same coin, for the same conditions equally give rise to each.  In a utopia, the 
transformation of existing conditions is not made dependent on the arduous and 
devastating transformation of the foundations of society. Rather, it is displaced to the 
minds of the subjects. 
The utopia of the Renaissance is the secularized expression of the old Medieval notion of 
heaven, without the arduous historical struggle for its creation. This utopian idealism 
ignores the objective, material productive conditions of the early capitalist society while 
it seeks its dream-like transformation in the subjective minds and good will of people, 
who are thereby supposed to eliminate the destructive power of private property. In its 
resistance against the increasing suffering and horror of the masses, such utopic critique 
is merely a reaction and thus, a continuance of the modern bourgeois logic of 
domination.  In this modern divide between the powerful social totality and the weakness 
of the individual person, those that are suffering in this system of domination have little 
to rely on but their own subjective fight for survival and the utopic dream of redemption. 
Again, as Horkheimer [1993:369] reminds us, utopias have two expressions: one being 
the critique of what is, and the other, being the representation of what should be.  For 
Horkheimer as for Adorno, the importance and truth of utopia is found in its critique.  As 
we shall see, Horkheimer’s critique of utopia is the substance of Adorno’s critique of 
Bloch’s philosophy of utopia. 
Utopic Change: Freedom in Time 
In the late 1960’s, the critical, political theologian Jürgen Moltmann, Professor of 
Theology at Tübingen University in Germany, was a Visiting Professor of Systematic 
Theology at Duke Divinity School in Durham, North Carolina, USA.  While here, 
Moltmann [1969, 1967], who was greatly influenced in the development of his theology 
of hope and of Christian eschatology by Ernst Bloch’s philosophy of hope, presented the 
theological doctrine of Christian eschatology in terms that expressed the influence of 
Bloch’s Marxist thinking on utopia, e.g., “The Prophecy of the New,” “Religion, 
Revolution, and the Future,” “Christians and Marxists Struggle for Freedom,” “God in 
Revolution,” “The Future as New Paradigm of Transcendence,” etc.  In the language of 
hope, Moltmann spoke about and wrote on the notion of utopia, its history, and its 
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Judeo/Christian religious roots. 
Moltmann made the historical distinction between the notion of utopias of freedom in 
space and utopias of freedom in time, between the existence of a New World and the 
historical “New Age” of the future.  Using the United States as his case study, Moltmann 
stated that for Europeans, where there was no longer any open and unpopulated territory, 
the New World of America with its vast open and supposedly unpopulated frontier, 
presented itself as a utopic chance for a new beginning, for freedom and happiness in a 
new place.  However, as this open frontier of America became more and more populated, 
it became obvious that in America as in Europe there was no “new” place to which one 
could travel and find such spatial freedom any more. With this experience of the 
“falseness” of the notion of utopia in space, a change occurred in the thought of 
utopia:  Freedom in space was changed now to the pursuit of freedom in time in terms of 
the movement in history toward a new future. 
In Europe, particularly for those who had no chance of emigrating to the New World or 
to any other far-off and thus, different place, people internalized their longing for 
freedom and made it into the spiritual world of the soul or mind.  Of course, this spiritual 
mystifying of the utopic longing for freedom and happiness did little if anything to 
change the actual, existing social conditions that produced the utopic longing for that 
which is “other” than what is.  As Marx [1975:85; Moltmann 1969:xii] stated, this 
reduction of human freedom to the realm of an inner light ultimately was changed 
through philosophic reflection seeking to realize itself outwardly in society and history. 
When philosophy turns itself as will against the world of appearance, then the system is 
lowered to an abstract totality, that is, it has become one aspect of the world which 
opposes another one. Its relationship to the world is that of reflection. Inspired by the 
urge to realize itself, it enters into tension against the other. The inner self-contentment 
and completeness has been broken. What was inner light has become consuming flame 
turning outwards. [Emphasis added by author] 
It is with this turn outward to now address the existing socio-historical conditions that 
generate the utopic longing for a more reconciled, free, rational, just, equitable, good, 
happy and peaceful future that the theory and praxis of utopia became dangerous to the 
status quo and its ruling elite. 
Religious Substance of Utopia: Eschatology 
As Marx, Bloch, Adorno, Benjamin [1968:253-264], Fromm [1949:257; 1966b, 1976, 
1992]; Moltmann, Metz [1980b, 1981], Habermas [2008a & b; 2006a; 2005b], and many 
others have stated, this dangerous, revolutionary longing for a better future in history is 
rooted in the myths, narratives, and teaching of the world religions. Particularly, the 
hope-filled utopic genre in time has its roots within Judaism’s and Christianity’s world-
shattering prophetic, Messianic, eschatological/apocalyptic theodicy proclamations that 
announced God’s kairos: the Infinite breaking into the finite world-order and history to 
liberate and redeem the enslaved, the oppressed, the suffering, dying and dead, in order to 
bring an end to this barbaric pre-human history and create a good “new creation” in 
preparation for the coming of God’s kingdom [e.g., Exodus 2:23-15:21; Deuteronomy 
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26:5b-10; Psalms 2, 9-10, 12, 14, 22, 33-34, etc.; Isaiah 9, 11, 60-66; Micah 4; Matthew 
5-7; Luke 4:4-18; Acts 2:42-45, 4:32-35; Romans 8:18-25, 12:1-2; 2 Corinthians 5:17-21; 
Ephesians 4:17-24; Revelation 21:1-6; Horkheimer 1972:129-187; Fromm 1992, 1966b; 
Bloch 1970b:118-141, 1972, 1986:I-III, 2000; Tillich 1926, 1968; Brown 1965; 
Moltmann 1967, 1969, 1996; Metz 1977, 1980b, 1981; Gutierrez 1973; Cardenal 1978, 
1979, 1982; Zizek 2000; Ott 2001, 2007:167-196, 273-306]. As Ernst Bloch [1986:1193] 
states: 
And if the maxim that where hope is, religion is, is true, then Christianity, with its 
powerful starting point and its rich history of heresy, operates as if an essential nature of 
religion had finally come forth here.  Namely that of being not static, apologetic myth, 
but humane-eschatological, explosively posited messianism.  It is only here – stripped of 
illusion, god-hypostases, taboo of the masters – that the only inherited substratum 
capable of significance in religion lives: that of being hope in totality, explosive hope. 
Particularly for Bloch, the Bible contains within itself a covert yet foundational 
underground, non-theocratic element of subversion, which biblical criticism and the 
interpretation of historical materialists have revealed.  The biblical scriptures proclaim 
not only the Deus absconditus [the hidden, unknown God] but also the homo 
absconditus, the hidden or not-yet human being, who was originally expressed in terms 
of Eritis sicut deus scientes bonum et malum [“You shall be like gods knowing good and 
evil” – Genesis 3:5] to the later prophetic, Messianic notion of the “Son of Man” [Daniel 
7:13; Matthew, Mark, Luke, John, Revelation 1:13, 14:14]. For Bloch [1972a:82], it is 
this hidden human being, who is the revolutionary substance of the Biblia pauperum [the 
paupers’ picture bible], that expresses the biblical intention of “overthrowing every state 
of affairs in which man appears as oppressed, despised and forgotten in his very being.” 
In the biblical Hebrew and New Testaments, it is this revolutionary underground intent 
that is the foundation for the creation of a utopia of religion’s non-mythical 
elements.  Although this revolutionary, religious potential became reified in the dogmatic 
notion of God, the original biblical call for people’s covenant with this God for the sake 
of God and humanity’s mutual future gave expression to future-oriented essence or 
entelechy of humanity.[3] For Bloch, the religious and secular utopic longing is “the 
pervading and above all only honest quality of human beings.” 
Doctrine of the End 
Christianity’s eschatological hope and revolutionary praxis for a new creation or new age 
in this world is the universalizing determinate negation [Aufhebung] – i.e., the negation, 
preservation, and furtherance – of Israel’s remembrance and hope of the liberating God of 
the Exodus and of the prophetic, Messianic promise of a time of peace, justice and 
integrity coming in which there will no longer be any type of predators and prey as the 
“the wolf will live with the lamb, the panther lies down with the kid, calf and lion cub 
feed together, with a little child to lead them” [Isaiah 11:6-9]; wherein the weapons of 
war, domination, fear and death (swords, spears, guns, bombs, tanks, missiles, WMDs) 
will be turned into instruments not of aggression and death but those that create life and 
happiness, e.g., plowshares, pruning hooks, universal health care systems, free education, 
etc. [Micah 4:3-4; Isaiah 2:3-4]. The revolutionary, historical materialist theory and 
praxis of utopia is the continuation of this determinate negation as it is the secular 
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translation or inversion of Christian eschatology and its social utopias [Bloch 1970b:118-
141; 1972a; Adorno 1973:207; Fromm 1992:3-94, 95-106, 147-168, 203-212; 1966b; Ott 
2001, 2007:167-196, 273-306]. According to Moltmann [1967], Christian eschatology 
was long called the ‘doctrine of the last things’ or the ‘doctrine of the end.’  According to 
this doctrine, the “fallen,” pre-history of humanity will be brought to its end through 
God’s kairos – the dawning of God’s New Creation. As a result of this New Creation 
being the work of God and not humanity, eschatology was theologically pushed to the 
end of history and thus, increasingly was seen to have little if anything to say about life in 
the world. Christianity’s eschatological hope for God’s New Creation, has thus become 
little more than an embarrassing addendum to the Christian evangelion, and as such, has 
become increasingly irrelevant. Coupled with this, the more Christianity became an 
institution of the Roman Empire and thus a religious component of the Roman state 
religion, the more eschatology and its concrete, revolutionary, prophetic and Messianic 
purpose in history was betrayed by the Church [Moltmann 1967, 1969, 1974, 1996; Metz 
1980, 1981; Horkheimer 1972:129-131, 1974a:34-50, 1985:385-404; Ott 2001, 
2007:167-186; Reimer 2007:71-90]. This demeaned and forgotten hope and praxis for a 
new and good future did not die out, however, but migrated into the struggle for a better 
future as expressed in the thought and action of revolutionary groups, e.g. the 
revolutionary Christian social utopianism of the 13th century Calabrian abbot Joachim di 
Fiore, the 16th century German radical reformer and Peasant War leader Thomas Münzer, 
Karl Marx and modern expressions of historical materialism, as well as the third-world 
base-Christian communities and the “Theology of Liberation,” etc. [Moltmann 1967, 
1969, 1974, 1996; Metz 1973c, 1980b, 1981; Bloch 1970b:118-141; 1971a:54-105, 159-
173; 1972a; 1972b; 1986a; Engels 1926; Gutierrez 1973, 1983; Cardenal 1976, 1978, 
1979, 1982]. 
Yet, in critically returning to the Hebrew and Christian biblical texts to confront the 
historical church’s betrayal of its own living and world-changing gospel – the dangerous, 
revolutionary memory, hope, and praxis of freedom in Jesus the Christ, critical, political 
theologians have made it clear that eschatology and its hope of a new future given by God 
is not the end but the beginning and dynamic, prophetic and Messianic purpose of 
Christianity [Metz 1980b, 1981; Moltmann 1967, 1969, 1974, 1996].  One is not to worry 
about one’s life, about one’s need of food, drink, clothing, commodities, nor even about 
tomorrow, but rather is “to renounce oneself and pick up one’s cross” for the sake of the 
oppressed so as to negate the fearful power of the cross and of death itself by setting 
one’s “heart on (God’s) kingdom first, and on (God’s) righteousness” and by so doing 
“all these other (material needs) will be given you as well” in the new, future community 
of love, equity and shalom – the new society/creation/history of which followers of Christ 
are to be “ambassadors” [Mark 8:34-38; Matthew 7:25-34, par. 33; 5:1-12; Acts 2: 42-47; 
2 Corinthians 5:17-20; Romans 12:1-2; Ephesians 4:17-24; Colossians 3:9-11; 4:32-351 
Peter 3:13-15; Revelation 21, 22].  As Bloch [1970:118-125] stated, there is no other 
book that remembers the nomadic God of freedom over and against the static gods of 
place and time and describes the corresponding nomadic institutions of “primitive semi-
communism” as does the Bible. 
A single line, full of curves but recognizable as one and the same, runs from the 
Nazarites’ memories of primitive semi-communism to the prophet’s preaching against 
wealth and tyranny and on to the early Christian communism of love [Acts 2, 4]. In its 
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background the line is almost unbroken; the famed prophetic depictions of a future 
kingdom of social peace reflect a Golden Age which in this case was no mere legend 
[Bloch 1970:119]. 
From the “Alpha” to the “Omega” from the beginning to the end, Christianity is 
eschatology, an anamnestic and proleptic hope and praxis for the promised and redeemed 
future of humanity and God.  Again, as Bloch states: 
“… nowhere is the Omega of Christian utopianism so untranscendent and at the same 
time so all-transcending, as in the ‘New Jerusalem’ of Revelations 21, 22.  Religion is 
full of utopianism, as is evident above all in the Omega which lies at its heart … This is a 
realm … where the world is totally transformed, so that (humanity) is no longer burdened 
with it as with a stranger.” 
Parousia Delay 
It is this future-oriented hope for the Omega – the New Creation of God and humanity -
that is the dynamic truth of Christianity that can lead to a revolutionary socio-historical 
praxis that transforms the present.  However, it is also this promise of and hope for the 
coming of the Omega that confronts Christianity with its destructive theodicy problem: 
the parousia delay.  In the gospel of Luke [9:27], Jesus told his disciples: “there are some 
standing here who will not taste death before they see the kingdom of God.”  It has been 
almost 2,000 years since this statement was made and yet the end of the barbaric, pre-
human history with the arrival of the Omega/kingdom of God has not happened. As 
history has shown, religions rise and fall in importance based on their ability to address 
convincingly and redemptively the theodicy question of the innocents’ suffering and 
dying in the world.  Because of the delay of the parousia as Christianity’s theodicy 
answer, the very prophetic, Messianic and eschatological substance of the Christian 
evangelion – to defiantly pick up the revolutionary “cross” of the present in order to 
negate its systemic power and deadliness in the hope for the promised New Creation of 
God – ends up sharing the same fate today as that of utopia: as being little more than a 
irrelevant myth. 
Restoring Utopia 
In their 1964 public discourse on the topic of utopian longing and its ambiguities [Bloch 
1988:1-17], Adorno stated that his friend Bloch [2000] was the one responsible for 
restoring honor to the word “utopia,” which began with his first book, The Spirit of 
Utopia.  In an article written in 1965, Adorno [1992:211-212] stated that he first read this 
book in 1921 when he was an 18-year-old student and found that like a trumpet blast, it 
aroused such profound expectations as to bring traditional philosophy into suspicion of 
being shallow and unworthy of itself. Through Bloch’s book, as though “written by 
Nostradamus himself,” philosophy escaped “the curse of being official” and “calibrated 
to the abominable resignation of methodology.” Bloch’s book was seen to be one 
continuous protest against thought’s positivistic conformity to conventional patterns, and 
thus gave a “promise of heresy” in a double sense of being mystically explosive and 
going far beyond the ceremonial expectations of the established intellectual culture. 
Adorno was so moved by this, that “prior to any theoretical content,” he identified 
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himself with Bloch’s critical intent and because of this, he did not believe that he ever 
wrote anything without either an implicit or explicit reference to this book. 
For Adorno, what is specific to Bloch’s entire philosophy is his emphasis on “the 
gesture” toward that which is other than what is.  This gesture is the dynamic potential 
within everything and is not to be understood as merely a subjective reference to the 
objective world.   Bloch [1972:264-265] spoke of this also “as the unassuaged, explosive 
hunger of the life-force,” as the search for meaning, for “the Not-yet of true human 
possession.”  It is only in this pursuit for the fulfillment of humanity’s utopian needs that 
“the radical, subversive dream of the Bible” can be realized.  This even applies to Bloch’s 
central and organizing notion of the messianic end of history and the corollary 
revolutionary praxis of historical transcendence. Written in the midst of the horror of 
World War I, and published at the War’s end in 1918 and republished in 1923 – in the 
beginning years of the nascent Weimar Republic, Bloch’s Spirit of Utopia was a defiant 
philosophic, Messianic theological, and transcendental poetic proclamation of utopic 
hope in the midst of the latency of the revolutionary “not-yet” that is located in the 
darkness of the present. 
So it goes without saying that even this: that we humans are, represents only an untrue 
form, to be considered only provisionally. … we are located in our own blind spot, in the 
darkness of the lived moment, whose darkness is ultimately our own darkness, being-
unfamiliar–to-ourselves, being-enfolded, being-missing. … Yet – and this is of decisive 
importance – the future, the topos of the unknown within the future, where alone we 
occur, where alone, novel and profound, the function of hope also flashes, without the 
bleak reprise of some anamnesis – is itself nothing but our expanded darkness, than our 
darkness in the issue of its own womb, in the expansion of its latency. Just as in all the 
objects of this world, in the “nothing” around which they are made, that twilight, that 
latency, that essential amazement predominates where merge the reserve and yet the 
strange “presence” of seeds of gold blended into, hidden in leaves, animals, pieces of 
basalt; whereby precisely the very thing-in-itself everywhere is this, which is not yet, 
which actually stirs in the darkness, the blueness, at the heart of objects [Bloch 2000: 
200-201, emphasis in the text itself]. 
This dialectical, liberation theory of utopia, of the “not-yet,” of its hope and the 
possibility of its continual realization in a truly new socio-historical future birthed from 
within the hidden “darkness” of the given, capitalist class dominated “civil society” was 
the dynamic emphasis of all of Bloch’s writings [e.g., 1970; 1971a; 1972a & b; 1976; 
1986; 1988; 2000]. Yet, for all of Adorno’s praise of his friend’s work on the topic of 
utopia coming from within their shared dialectical methodology of historical materialism, 
there were fundamental differences in their theoretical understanding and approach to this 
important notion and its praxis. 
Religions Migration into the Secular 
Hegel: 
A dominant argument in the resurrection of utopian thought in Bloch’s work as well as 
the first and second generation of the Critical Theory of the Frankfurt School is the 
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needed migration of the religious eschatological hope for a more humane and reconciled 
future into the secular, particularly into the theory and praxis of historical 
materialism.  This modern, dialectical movement of the religious into the secular is 
grounded in Hegel’s Absolute Idealism and Logos Logic, wherein the object of religion is 
“eternal truth in its objectivity, God and nothing but God” which is translated into 
philosophical “knowledge of that which is eternal, of what God is, and what flows out of 
God’s nature” [Hegel 1984:152-153; 1974a:18-20; 1967a:70-88; 1956:7-41;].  In both 
religion and philosophy, “the object is Truth, in that supreme sense in which God and 
God only is the Truth” [Hegel 1991:24/§1]. Thus, for Hegel [1969b:50; Genesis 1, 
Wisdom 1-9, John 1], the content of his Logos Logic as the system of pure reason and the 
realm of pure thought is nothing less than “the exposition of God as he is his eternal 
essence before the creation of nature and a finite mind.” For Hegel, religion and 
philosophy have the same content, need, and interest in the service of God but differ only 
in their distinctive approaches to the Absolute. The true form of truth as science is the 
determinate negation of religious representational thought and image, with its immediacy 
of knowledge expressed in terms of feelings, ecstasy and intuition, into its philosophical, 
scientific form. According to Hegel [1967a:79ff], truth is grasped and expressed not as a 
monochrome, formalistic Substance, as in Transcendental Idealism’s Naturphilosophie 
which expresses the Absolute as the inert night in which are to be found, in which “all 
cows are black,[4]” but as Subject, will and action as well.  This Subject is not conceived 
dualistically as the isolated bourgeois monad over and against that objectivity that is 
equally empty and reified, but is rather the living Substance that is realized in the process 
of its own self-actualization in history, which mediates or determinately negates itself 
from one state into its opposite.  This is Subject as pure and simple negativity through 
which it reinstates its self-identity in returning to itself through its otherness in history 
[Hegel 1967a:80ff].  For Hegel [1956:9ff], God’s Divine Providence, Wisdom, or Reason 
is both the substance and infinite energy of the universe.  God rules the world understood 
as both physical and psychical nature and thus, rules both nature and the history of world, 
which as he states “is not the theater of happiness” [Hegel 1956:9ff, 26]. Hegel 
[1967a:81ff, 808; 1956:21] makes perfectly clear that the notion of God ruling the world 
becomes an ideological false consciousness and collapses into edification, which can be 
utilized to legitimate the horrors of society and history, if it lacks the seriousness, 
suffering, patience and labor of the negative, of history as a “slaughter bench” of the 
innocent and as a Golgotha of the Absolute Spirit.  The task of philosophy is to 
comprehend Reason in that which historically exists, not to instruct how things ought to 
be, but rather to reveal how humanity, thought, morality, the family, civil society, the 
State and culture are to be understood.  For Hegel [1967b:11-13], God’s Reason is 
thereby understood to be “the rose in the cross of the present” that is to be comprehended 
and enjoyed, which thereby allows people to possess a subjective freedom while living in 
what exists in truth. This was Hegel’s [1956:15; 1974a:83-85; 1974b:1-10;] Theodicæea, 
or philosophical justification of God in the face of the horror of history. By Reason’s own 
dialectical march through history, determinately negating that which prevents Reason’s 
further realization in the dawn of a new age, history will move to its consummation in the 






The left-wing Hegelian, Karl Marx, critiqued Hegel’s translation of religious content into 
his idealistic philosophy and Logos Logic as theodicy.  Marx rejected the theological 
content of Hegel’s philosophy as a mystification of his own dialectical method. As Marx 
[1976:102-103] stated, his dialectical method is not only different from Hegel’s but is 
“exactly opposite to it.”  The real world is not created by God or “the Idea” but it is just 
the reverse.  The real, material world is what is reflected into human thought and 
religiously projected into the notion of God, who thereby acquires an independent 
subjectivity outside of the world. This projection theory of God was developed in the 
materialism of Ludwig Feuerbach [1957], a materialism that Marx [1998:569-571] 
critiqued as being bourgeois since Feuerbach reduces the correction of this projection to 
“sensuous intuition” of the individual and not to a revolutionizing practice.  Although he 
rejected Feuerbach’s theory, Marx stated nevertheless that Feuerbach is the “river of fire” 
through which one must walk to come to the shore of truth and freedom in historical 
materialism. Marx [1976:103] rejected the mystified, religious content of Hegel’s 
philosophy but not his dialectical methodology of determinate negation, which was the 
first to unfold the general dynamic of dialectical movement as a comprehensive and 
conscious method.  For this, in the face of the increasing empiricist rejection of Hegel 
and dialectics itself as being a “dead dog,” Marx [1976:102-103] praised Hegel as a great 
thinker and declared himself Hegel’s pupil. However, Marx materialistically inverted 
Hegel’s philosophy as theodicy, which justifies the sovereignty of God’s Reason in the 
barbarism of history, so as to focus rationally on the negativity of that history as the 
slaughter bench and cruel altar upon which the innocent, weak, slaves, serfs, peasants, 
and the modern working class have been and continue to be sacrificed.  This history of 
class domination and its horror for billions upon billions of its innocent victims is not to 
be philosophically interpreted and thereby merely understood but is to be exposed and 
thereby negated by revolutionary class praxis for the creation of a real, consciously 
created human history. Imaged as the “owl of Minerva,” which spreads its wings and 
takes flight only with the falling of dusk when the age has become old, Hegel [1967b:13] 
admits that philosophy cannot change what is but can only “paint its grey in grey” and 
thus, understand it.  As Marx [1998:574] stated in his eleventh thesis on Feuerbach, this 
philosophical interpretation of the world is not good enough. The owl of Minerva is to be 
replaced by the “Gallic Cock” whose crowing announces the revolutionary birth of 
change toward a utopic new age of liberation; the beginning of true human history [Marx 
2002:182]. It is of particular interest that in continuing his great teacher Hegel’s 
idealistic, dialectical thought, Bloch [1976:8-9] images the herald of the new age not as 
Marx’s Gallic Cock but as the owl of Minerva, who, he says, “does not fly in the dusk, 
among the ruins of contemplation … but rather because a thought is rising which belongs 
to the dawn, to that open time of day which is least alien of all to Minerva, the goddess of 
light. … [In this] the owl becomes what it really is for Minerva: the allegory of 
vigilance.”  The images not withstanding, both Marx and Bloch give expression to their 
truth in the “genius of dialectics” as a force of revolutionary change. 
According to Marx’s [2002:171-182] materialist dialectical critique, religion is the 
fantastic mystifying product and “spiritual aroma” of this horrifying pre-human history of 
class domination. When this history is finally negated through the conscious, 
revolutionary creation of a classless, non-alienated, and reconciled future society, both 
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religion and the State as systems of domination will “wither away.”  Yet, within this 
history, religion nevertheless plays an ambiguous role.  On the one hand, as expressed 
particularly in the history of Christianity, religion functions as socio-cultural ideology 
that produces a false consciousness of reality in humanity.  As such, it gives an “aura” of 
religious legitimation to the reified economic and political relations of social production 
and its class antagonisms. This is religion of and for the victors of history’s class 
war.  This is religion as “an inverted consciousness of the world” that blesses the 
dehumanizing global system of class domination by the few – the “winners” – that 
produces the resulting suffering and horror of the many – the “losers” – to continue.  In 
this barbarically “inverted” society and history, this is positivistically called “progress” 
[Benjamin 1968:253-264]. As a social action system given the function of producing 
equilibrium and maintenance within a society and history of class domination, religion 
thus becomes the illusory happiness of people that thereby allows if not demands that 
people avoid taking responsibility for “pulling the emergency brake” on this 
“progressive” train ride through hell for the revolutionary purpose of creating a more 
humane, reconciled and shalom-filled future society.  As Marx [2002:179; Adorno 1973, 
1974; Horkheimer and Adorno 1972; Benjamin 1968:253-264; 1999:456-488] states, it is 
not this radical revolution for universal human emancipation that is a utopic dream, but 
rather it is the patch-work reform efforts of partial socio-political changes that allow the 
structures and system of inequity, suffering, horror and death to stay in place that is the 
ideological covering of dystopia. For Marx, it is the dual task of philosophy to not merely 
interpret the world but to change it by unmasking the religiously veiled deadly “Medusa 
head” of class domination and of Capital [Marx 2002:171; 1976:91]. For once, the “holy 
form of human self-estrangement” has been unmasked, then the “unholy forms” of 
human alienation and enslavement can be unmasked and revolutionarily changed.  Thus, 
criticism of religion in the form of its own betrayal of its substance turns into 
emancipatory criticism of the socio-historical system and structures of domination and 
death. 
This socio-historical revolutionary task, however, gives expression to Marx’s other, 
humanistic understanding of religion within the history of class domination, namely, its 
protest against domination and the cry for liberation.  It is in this understanding of 
religion as protest against the murderous social system of class domination in history, 
which gives expression to the utopic longing of the oppressed for liberation/redemption 
that religion contributes to the secular, historical materialist theory and praxis of 
revolution. In the tradition and spirit of the Hebrew prophets and of Jesus of Nazareth, 
religion, particularly in its sacred texts from which the institutions of these religions can 
never escape, expresses real human suffering and the protest against it.  Thus, for Marx 
[2002:171-172], religion as protest “is the sigh of the oppressed creature, the heart of a 
heartless world and the soul of soulless conditions.”  In this veil of tears world, religion is 
“the opium of the people,” who use it as a form of self-medication to bring some relief 
against their systemically produced alienation and hopeless suffering.  This prophetic and 
Messianic cry and protest against the systemic exploitation, degradation, suffering, and 
death of innocent victims is the revolutionary, ethical substance of the Abrahamic 
religions – Judaism, Christianity, and Islam – that is betrayed by these religions own 
historical institutions that make up Marx’s [2002:171-182] despised first form of religion 
as pre-human history’s general theory, encyclopedic compendium, popular form of logic, 
its point of spiritual honor, its enthusiasm, moral sanction, and universal basis of 
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consolation and justification.  Until the revolutionary day in which this history of class 
domination is ended, the religiously expressed protest of this history’s innocent victims 
and their longing for the creation of a reconciled and good world needs to be heard and 
included in the theory and praxis of revolution. 
Marx’s Materialist Christology 
Marx’s notion of the ambiguity of religion, and his appreciation of religion as protest, has 
been poignantly preserved in Marx’s daughter Eleanor’s remembrance of her 
father.  Eleanor Marx-Aveling [Fromm 1961b:252-253] was asked by some Austrian 
friends to send them some remembrances of her father after his death on March 14, 1883. 
In these recollections, Eleanor tells of her father taking her to a Roman Catholic Church 
to hear the beautiful music, which produced for the young girl questions about 
Christianity.  She confided these questions to her father, whom she called “Mohr,” who 
quietly and gently answered her questions so clearly that no doubt about religion ever 
crossed her mind again.  Marx told his young daughter the plain and unadulterated truth 
about Jesus of Nazareth – the Christ – as “the carpenter whom the rich men killed.”  This 
non-theological, historically backed statement – one of the few if not only one that is 
verified by non-Christian writings, e.g., the Roman historian Tacitus and the Jewish 
historical Josephus – is the most precise, truthful and ecclesiastical damning historical 
materialist Christology ever spoken concerning the rejection, torture, suffering and death 
of this poor, revolutionary faithful, day-laborer Jesus of Nazareth.  In this simple 
statement to his young daughter, Marx gave expression to the abhorrent ambiguity of 
religion – in this case Christianity – giving voice to the tortured cries and longing for 
redemption of the oppressed whom the capitalist class kills spiritually, psychically and 
physically, all the while this very same religion blesses the very system of the rich and 
powerful that does the killing.  It was religion as the defiant, utopian cry for 
eschatological redemption – for that “no place … yet” that migrated into Marx’s 
dialectical materialism’s goal of a new historical age that would be brought about through 
the revolutionary praxis of the oppressed proletarian class. 
Materialist Inversion 
As heirs and critics of Hegel’s idealistic and Marx’s materialistic dialectical translations 
of religion into secular theory and praxis, both Adorno and Bloch also gave conflicting 
expression to the need for the religious to “migrate” into secular form. Both Adorno’s 
and Bloch’s dialectical theories are deeply grounded in and expressive of the historical 
materialist “inversion” of the Judaic and the Christian prophetic, Messianic and 
eschatological religious content.  For both, their critical philosophy contained within 
itself religion as an inheritance, as the dialectical determinate negation of the religious 
into their critical, materialist logic and theory of critique and of revolutionary social 
transformation.  Both theorists knew that if religion was to have anything of relevance to 
contribute in critically addressing the increasing irrationality and barbarism of the 
capitalist system, the religious form – the language, dogma, rituals, symbols, institutions, 
reified traditions, etc. – needed to be determinately negated for the possibility of the 
religious content of protest and liberation to be translated into modern secular 
emancipatory language and praxis. 
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It was Adorno who stated explicitly the need of the theological content of religion to 
migrate into modern secular form. In his article entitled “Reason and Revelation,” 
Adorno [1998:136] stated: 
If one does not want either to fall under the sway of the notion that whatever has long 
been well known is for that reason false, or to accommodate oneself to the current 
religious mood that – as peculiar as it is understandable – coincides with the prevailing 
positivism, then one would do best to remember Benjamin’s infinitely ironic description 
of theology, “which today as we know, is wizened and has to keep out of sight.”  Nothing 
of theological content will persist without being transformed, every content will have to 
put itself to the test of migrating into the realm of the secular, the profane. [Emphasis 
added by author]. 
This dialectical transformation of religion into the secular critical theory of Max 
Horkheimer, Adorno, Benjamin, et al. is expressed by Adorno’s as an “inverse theology” 
into which, as he told Benjamin, he would “gladly see (their) thoughts dissolve” [Adorno 
and Benjamin 1999:66-67, 52-59 (par 53-54), 104-116, 116-120; Adorno 1973, 2008; 
Horkheimer and Adorno 1972]. Like Horkheimer, Benjamin, and Marx, Adorno’s inverse 
theology is a radicalized application of the second and third Commandment of Judaism’s 
Decalogue against imaging or naming the sacred [Exodus 20:4-7].  The second and third 
Commandments state: 
You shall not make yourself a carved image of any likeness of anything in heaven or on 
earth beneath or in the waters under the earth; you shall not bow down to them of serve 
them.  For I, Yahweh your God, am a jealous God and I punish the father’s fault in the 
sons, the grandsons, and the great-grandsons of those who hate me’ but I show kindness 
to thousands of those who love me and keep my commandments [Exodus 20:4-6]. 
You shall not utter the name of Yahweh your God to misuse it, for Yahweh will not leave 
unpunished the man who utters his name to misuse it [Exodus 20:7]. 
The critical theorists radicalized these commandments against any type of idolatry 
through the inversion of the religious faith in God into the secular, historical, critical 
longing for that which is “other”- if not totally “Other”/God – than the social and natural 
catastrophe produced throughout history by the dominant classes’ warfare on the 
powerless masses of humanity in their pursuit of ever-more power and capital. 
New Categorical Imperative 
It is this course of pre-human history that, in Adorno’s [1972:365ff] words, forces 
materialism upon metaphysics and religion, its traditionally conceived antithesis.  Adorno 
[1972:365ff; 1998:191-204; 1997b] explains that his modern dialectical synthesis of two 
formerly opposite forces is the result of the “Shoah,” summarized by the name of the 
largest Nazi extermination camp – “Auschwitz,” in which human reason was used 
instrumentally and strategically to create not the highest good but absolute evil through 
the systematic persecution and mass genocide of Jews, the mentally ill and disabled, 
gypsies, homosexuals, Christians of the non-conformist “Confessing Church,” protesting 
students – e.g. “The Edelweiss Pirates,” “The White Rose,” Communists, Socialists, and 
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many other nationalities deemed “unworthy.” This monstrosity of the mind and of reason 
has produced a new categorical imperative for modernity: that Auschwitz never happens 
again [Adorno 1998:191-204].  This horror is not to be reduced to a mere intellectual and 
moral discourse on what happened. The morality of this new imperative, imposed on 
modernity by Hitler and the Nazis, is rooted not in the mind but in the practical bodily 
pathos of solidarity with the innocent victims and thus, and an outrage against such 
barbarism ever happening again. As Adorno [1972:365ff] states, it is in such 
materialistically driven undistorted, genuine and practical solidarity with the innocent 
victims of history’s slaughter-bench that morality survives at all. 
The Rise of Reason 
According to Adorno [1974:238-244; 1972:23-24; 1973:207] the religious development 
of Monotheism was the rise of human consciousness through “‘judicious reason’ that had 
elevated itself to the notion of one God” that showed it to be to some degree more free of 
earlier forms of human submission to the power of nature. The “great,” prophetic, 
Messianic, eschatological religions of Judaism and Christianity are expressions of the 
rational development of humanity in its still rational pre-maturity.  Both Judaism and 
Christianity – with its eschatological proclamation of the resurrection of the flesh at the 
dawning of the Kingdom of God – took very seriously the dialectical inseparability of the 
spiritual and physical. In the Jewish religion, the dialectical disenchantment of the world 
and thus, the advance of human consciousness beyond magic and myth is expressed in 
the second and third commandments prohibition of making any image of or pronouncing 
the name of God.  Judaism allows no word that would alleviate the despair of or bring 
consolation to that which is mortal.  In Judaism, hope is expressed negatively in the ban 
against making anything finite into infinite; of making the lie into truth; of making the 
limited and thus, false into the Absolute.  Humanity’s emancipation, happiness, 
redemption and salvation are dialectically conceived of as the rejection of anything that 
would replace this negative and thus, historically dynamic hope of the oppressed.  It is for 
this reason, as Walter Benjamin [1968:253-264] and Yosef Haytim Yerushalmi [1996:5-
26] have made clear, that Jews were not to be concerned about the future.  The future and 
the coming of the Messiah was the domain of God alone.  Rather, in resistance against 
losing the historical foundation and identity of Israel’s covenantal faith with Yahweh, the 
Hebrew biblical texts [e.g. Exodus 20:1-3; Deuteronomy 26:5-10] instruct Israel to 
remember (Zakor) the redemptive acts of Yahweh as well as the deeds, hope and 
suffering of the faithful in the past. In Judaism, the truth of the being and notion of God is 
preserved in the faithful pursuit of its not being reified into an idol and thus, equated with 
anything finite.  In Judaism, the truth of the being and notion of God is preserved in the 
faithful pursuit of its not being reified into an idol and thus, equated with anything 
finite.  Adorno’s negative dialectics is the consistent, radicalized application of these 
Judaic prohibitions against hallowing anything in this world as an expression of the Holy, 
the Good, the Truth.  He particularly applied this to the notion of utopia. 
Negative Dialectics 
Both Adorno and Bloch inherited their dialectical logic and method from the idealistic 
dialectics of Hegel and the historical materialist dialectics of Marx; both of whom were 
the heirs of the dialectic within Judaism and Christianity. In Adorno’s critical theory of 
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society and religion, these religious prohibitions have migrated into the dynamic 
substance of his negative dialectical methodology of “determinate negation.”  Since the 
time of Plato, dialectics has been understood to be the method of achieving something 
positive – the new – by means of “mediation” or negation [Hegel 1967a: (par. 80-88); 
1969b; Adorno 1973; Bloch 1976; Žižek 1993; Siebert 2013:7-31].  For Hegel 
[1967a:81-82], “the truth is the whole.”  However, the truth only realizes itself through 
the process of its own unfolding. This logical and historical transition is accomplished via 
mediation, which “is nothing but self-identity working itself out through an active self-
directed process; or, in other words, it is reflection into self … It is pure negativity, or … 
the process of bare and simple becoming” [Hegel 1967a:82]. Truth, philosophically 
understood, means the agreement of a content with itself. However, 
God alone is the genuine agreement between Concept and reality; all finite things, 
however, are affected with untruth; they have a concept, but their existence is not 
adequate to it.  For this reason they must perish, and this manifests the inadequacy 
between their concept and their existence [Hegel 1991:60] 
The dialectical method of negating the negative is thereby understood to free the 
historical process of that which prohibits the creation of the positive: the “entelechia of 
the All!” [Bloch 1976:6].  For Hegel [1969b:836f] “the negative of the negative, is 
immediately the positive, the identical, the universal.” Marx’s materialistic inversion of 
Hegel’s idealistic dialectical methodology envisioned the same positive result in terms of 
the creation of the historically new, communist society that would be achieved through 
the revolutionary negation of history as the continuation of class domination. Adorno’s 
negative dialectics rejects both of his predecessor’s positions (as well as that of Bloch 
[1976]) as being too “militantly optimistic.” As an expression of the theological ban on 
naming or imaging the Absolute, the dialectical negation of the negative does not 
automatically create or naturally unfold the positive. Instead as history has shown, such 
hope filled negation of what is can produce even more horrifying conditions than what 
existed before.  This is the historical epitaph of the French Revolution turning into the 
terror of the guillotine and the Russian Revolution turning into Stalin’s gulags and the 
extermination of millions of peasants. 
Dialectics as Writing 
For Adorno, the negative dialectics of determinate negation translates every image as 
writing; a method that reveals in its very process the limitedness and falseness of such 
images, while yet appropriating them in the historical pursuit and longing for truth. 
Unlike positivism that reduces and thereby reifies the dialectical relation between the 
subject and object, between thought and reality into a “scientific” system of identity and 
thus domination, for Adorno [1973; Horkheimer & Adorno: 1972], dialectics is an “anti-
system” that expresses the consistent sense of non-identity; that subjective concepts, 
images, language, and knowledge cannot grasp [Begriff] the entirety of its object. For 
Adorno, that which is contradictory to the reified civil society of capitalism is that which 
is non-identical to the identity producing system of society. That which contradicts the 
system and the manufactured consciousness of an identity producing social totality is the 
non-identical that has the threatening capability of exposing the authoritarian lie of a 
positivistic, identity producing social system of domination.  Thus, dialectics is not the 
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taking of an ideological standpoint.  Rather, it is the awareness that reality goes beyond 
the thought of it.  Dialectics is the awareness of thought’s insufficiency in giving 
expression to reality.  The dialectical methodology of determinate negation acknowledges 
that there is always an objective remainder that lies beyond the concept of it; that the 
concept does not exhaust the thing conceived.  As such, dialectics is born from within the 
experience of the negative and, thus, is the consistent sense of nonidentity [Adorno 
1973:3-57, esp. 5, Part II; Marcuse 1941:vii-xiv]. The Hegelian/Marxian dialectical logic 
and its methodology of determinate negation are thus, much more than the “algebra of 
revolution” [Rees 1998: par. 145, 60n]. Dialectics arise from and apply to every aspect of 
human experience and knowledge in the pursuit of truth, human liberation and happiness. 
Yet, in socio-historical terms, the methodology of dialectics is at least this method of 
revolution as it identifies the reified untruth of every system of domination and seeks its 
overthrow.  It reveals not only that the authoritarian concept does not express that which 
it is supposed to grasp and represent in truth, but also that the class-dominated social 
system that creates the ideology of identity falls far short of its expressed cultural and 
political ideals. The dialectical methodology of determinate negation ruthlessly identifies 
the contradiction between the concept and experience and reveals that there is “something 
missing” [Brecht 2007:20], that there is a non-identical, contradictory “residue” [Bloch 
1988:2ff.] or “remainder” [Adorno 1973:4-8, Part II] that lies outside of the 
representation and control of the system and ideology of identity production.  Thus, the 
dialectical dynamic of determinate negation is the negation of that which limits humanity 
in its struggle toward freedom, solidarity, and happiness. As expressed by Hegel, Marx 
and the Critical Theorists, the method of determinate negation is not abstract or total 
negation, which divides knowledge and thus life into antagonistic realms, but the 
negation of that specific element that no longer allows the significance, meaning, 
happiness or truth of life to be expressed adequately or experienced.  This realization 
produces of itself the dialectical dynamic of determinate negation as the perpetual pursuit 
of objective knowledge and truth through the negation of those specific forms of 
knowledge that are not adequate to its object. 
Life is Not Lived 
Adorno’s negative dialectics is thereby materialistically grounded in the experience of 
life’s pain and negativity; the knowledge that in the metastasizing global system of 
capitalism, there is no life any longer. It is the awareness that “there is no longer any 
beauty or consolation except in the gaze falling on horror, withstanding it, and in 
unalleviated consciousness of negativity holding fast to the possibility of what is better” 
[Adorno 1974:25].  Adorno thereby brought the theological ban on images into secular 
form “by not permitting Utopia to be positively pictured,” which would hypostatize the 
utopic as something known toward which those with such knowledge will lead.  For 
Adorno [1974:50; 1993:87; 1973], the truth is not the whole but rather “the whole is the 
false/the untrue.” This untruth of totality is not merely mythical but a very real, socio-
historical force of systemic domination and illusion that entraps and subsumes 
everything. By exposing the untruth of totality, thought satisfies the postulate of 
determinate negation. Thus, the possibility of a utopic redemption of life is to be 
contemplated negatively, not as dystopia but as the living, historical theory and praxis of 
determinately negating that which causes the suffering and destruction of humanity and 
nature.  “In the end hope, wrested from reality by negating it, is the only form in which 
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truth appears.  Without hope, the idea of truth would be scarcely even thinkable …” 
[Adorno 1974:98].  As Adorno [1974:247] stated, this determinate negation of the 
negative is the religious notion of redemption that has been translated into his historical 
materialism. It is this materialistic understanding of redemption that is the “light” of 
knowledge – the light of the history.  As Adorno [1993: 88] stated, “The ray of light that 
reveals the whole to be untrue in all its moments is none other than utopia, the utopia of 
the whole truth, which is still to be realized.” The dialectical methodology of determinate 
negation “is the ontology of the wrong state of things” and as such serves the utopic end 
of achieving reconciliation [Adorno 1973:6-11]. 
All other forms of knowledge are seen to be little more than positivistic techniques to 
“progressively” reconstruct what already exists.  For Adorno, Horkheimer, and Benjamin, 
from the experiences of those who are “non-identical” – the poor, the oppressed, the 
weak, the dying and the dead, critical perspectives and interpretations need to be created 
that reveal the deadliness of existing society and its history “as it will appear one day in 
the messianic light.”  In this can be heard the materialistic inversion of the prophetic, 
Messianic, and eschatological longings for the future of the Omega God, who broke into 
the nightmare of history to set at liberty the oppressed and to make all things New, as 
proclaimed in the biblical texts of Judaism and Christianity.  Here, in the historical 
struggle for the negation of the causes of suffering and of that which prevents the 
fulfillment of satisfying human need, materialism comes full circle to be united with 
theology, as it too seeks the resurrection of the body of humanity and of nature in a new 
history and thus, a new creation.  This, as Adorno states, is the task of knowledge in the 
light of redemption and of its revolutionary praxis.  Yet, as he states, this task is an 
“utterly impossible thing” since it is a perspective that idealistically stands outside of the 
reality of which it is a part. “Hic Rhodus, his saltus” [Hegel 1967b:11]. This perspective 
and knowledge of redemption is thus infected with the same disease that it seeks to 
escape [Horkheimer 1972:129-131].  This is a positively conceived utopia of “perfect 
justice” that in its idealistic flight beyond the cruel reality of the present ultimately 
dissolves into irrelevancy and tragically sinks unconsciously into the quagmire of 
injustice that it wants to change. In the spirit of the radicalized Decalogue prohibitions 
translated into his materialist negative dialectics, Adorno asserts that this positive utopic 
impossibility must be acknowledged for the sake of that which is possible. It is because 
of Adorno’s [1998:133-142; 1973] translation of Judaism’s prohibitions of naming and/or 
imaging the Absolute into his negative, materialist dialectics that he rejected of any type 
of revealed faith and its utopic image of a redeemed future and steadfastly held on to the 
radically negative materialist interpretation of the religious prohibition of images. This 
negative dialectical approach to the utopic, quite simply, is the substance of Adorno’s 
critique of Bloch utopic thought, as well as it being the basis of Bloch’s critique of 
Adorno’s. 
Religion as Inheritance 
Bloch [1972:82] also expressed the need for the translation of Christianity’s utopic, 




“the Bible only has a future inasmuch as it can, with this future, transcend 
without transcendence. Without the Above-us, transposed, Zeus-like, high up-
there, but with the ‘unveiled face,’ potentially in the Before-us, of our true 
Moment (nunc stans).” 
In speaking of the relevancy and future of the Bible and of the biblical religions ability to 
“transcend [the present] without transcendence,” Bloch changed the traditional vertical 
axis orientation of Hellenistic theological thinking in Christianity back into that first 
Jewish apocalyptic paradigm of early Christianity; to the revolutionary Jewish and 
Christian responsibility for making the religion’s utopic hope of the eschaton – of the 
mythologically conceived “end-time” – a goal of history [Küng 1995:CI-II].  Because of 
this, the critical, political theologian Moltmann [1969:Chapt. VIII] stated that Bloch’s 
entire philosophy of hope results in a type of “meta-religion.” To be heirs of this 
religiously expressed explosive hope for the end of the continuing history of inequity and 
misery through the dawning of a new and just creation, historical materialism must 
embody religion’s – especially Christianity’s – eschatological hope. For as Bloch 
[1987:1370] states, “Marxism, in all its analyses the coldest detective, takes the fairytale 
seriously, takes the dream of a Golden Age practically; real debit and credit of real hope 
begins.” The Judeo-Christian archetype of the prophetic, Messianic, and eschatological 
Kingdom of Freedom overthrowing and historically transcending – without reducing this 
to other-worldly transcendence – the reified and deadly Kingdom of Necessity towards a 
concrete utopia in the future is the dynamic religious heritage of revolutionary Marxism 
[Bloch 1972; Žižek 2000, 2003, 2010; Žižek and Milbank 2009]. For Bloch, it is only 
Marxism that has taken the utopic substance of Christianity’s expressions of hope and 
liberation and transformed them into the revolutionary theory and praxis for a better 
world; one that does not abstractly repudiate the present world but seeks its 
metaphysically inspired determinate negation so as to allow its materialistic Meta, the 
Novum contained and restrained within the present, the “Tomorrow within the Today,” 
the “Not-yet-essentially-being” and the moral “Ought” to unfold and develop its truth 
logically in history. For Bloch [2000:179-186], it is in this inward, transcendental and 
thus, becoming understanding of humanity and history that Kant’s Subjective Idealism 
and Schelling’s Transcendental Idealistic Philosophy of Nature triumph over or “burns 
through” Hegel’s Absolute Idealism, which Bloch states has objectified all their “inward” 
utopic vision and impulse into his “explicitly concluded system.” Because of Bloch’s 
almost ontologically conceived historical materialism, which metaphysically envisioned 
the historical necessity of nature and humanity’s freedom and truth ultimately realizing 
themselves in and through each other, Habermas [1983:61-77] called Bloch “a Marxist 
Schelling.” Adorno expresses the same critique of Bloch’s utopic philosophy, albeit more 
critically. 
Fundamental Differences 
Although both Bloch and Adorno identify themselves as historical materialists, and are 
thoroughly grounded in the dialectical methodology of both Hegel and Marx, there are 
serious, fundamental theoretical and political differences between them on the notion of 
utopia. Both of these differences were expressed by Adorno [1991b:200-215] in his 1959 
revised review of Bloch book Spuren (Traces).  In this review, Adorno also compares 
Bloch’s utopic philosophy with that of the Romantic philosophy of Schelling and with 
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literary Expressionism, which express their discontent with the reification of 
modernity.  However, according to Adorno, Bloch is not content to stay in the midst of 
the objective, social negativity and seek to create something wherein human subjectivity 
can find itself. While his historical, philosophical focus remains on the experiences of 
individuals, Bloch nevertheless addresses the objective conditions in a regressive 
expressionist, narrative form of knowledge that belongs to the past. Adorno [1992:218-
219] expresses this lack of critical philosophical substance in Bloch’s philosophy by 
comparing it to the invention of a Hassidic tale and as being “in close proximity to 
sympathy for the occult.” Adorno [1999:8] harshly expressed his critique of Bloch’s 
philosophy of utopia in a letter to his friend Siegfried Kracauer as being “the toilet stench 
of eternity.”  Adorno [1973:56-57] rejected Bloch’s more transcendent use of dialectics, 
since for Adorno dialectics focuses on the content of reality, which is not reified.  Unlike 
positivism, which is the mythology of what already exists and has become today the new, 
albeit perverted form of enlightenment, dialectics is the protest against all forms of 
mythology and its cyclical reification of reality.  “To want substance in cognition is to 
desire a utopia,” since it is the content of reality that produces this desire for utopia and 
the consciousness of its possibility. Utopia, therefore, is prevented by the dream of its 
possibility, but not by the immediate reality in which the possibility of the utopic can be 
found.  From within the midst of reality, real thinking is in the service of the utopic as a 
concrete element of existence that points beyond itself – no matter how negatively – to 
that which is not.  As Adorno [Adorno & Horkheimer 2011:1-17, esp. 4-5] said in a 
discourse with his close friend Horkheimer, thinking cannot be limited to the mere 
positivistic reproduction of what exists. This is the reduction of thought into an 
instrumental technique that merely reproduces what already is.  However, the dynamic 
truth of Reason, which can instrumentally keep the machinery of society running, also 
contains that which is other than what is.  Of course, there is no guarantee that this other 
will ever be realized, but there is no thinking without the thinking of that otherness. The 
positivistic reification of thinking, knowledge, reality, and of life itself in the socio-
historical development toward total integration of everything into the dominating empire 
of capitalist equivalence is the consequence of modernity’s rejection of utopia.  When the 
sigh and longing for the utopic, for that which is “not yet,” is rejected, then reason and 
thinking die.  Historical materialism, thus, is the prism in which the color of utopia is 
refracted as the not guaranteed possibility of determinately negating the negativity from 
within the concrete present. 
Adorno’s [1977:151-176] critique of Bloch’s philosophy of utopia extended into his – as 
well as Georg Lukács’ and Brecht’s – enthusiastic celebration of Soviet society as the 
beginning realization of the hoped for utopic reconciliation of past antagonisms. 
However, as Adorno [1977:176] states, the antagonisms and their terrible consequences 
remain, exposing the assertion that they were being overcome as a lie. Because of this, 
Adorno [1991b:214] accused Bloch of telling stories about the transformation of the 
world as if it was the fulfillment of what had been pre-decided, with little reflection on 
what had happened to the Revolution or to the concept and possibility of revolution under 
completely changed socio-historical conditions. 
For Bloch, on the other hand, it was precisely Adorno’s unrelenting negativity, of his 
radical application of the Decalogue prohibitions to utopic thought that raised despair to a 
level in which any revolutionary struggle for change is meaningless, that Bloch could not 
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accept.  According to Bloch, Adorno’s “…reified despair counts for no more than reified 
confidence of the kind that has been practiced from time immemorial by the church and 
the authorities with their highly conformist message ‘Be consoled’ [Claussen 
2008:273].”  Against its own intentions, such negativity allows the status quo to remain 
the same. 
Realized Utopic Dreams 
These similarities and differences in Adorno’s and Bloch’s [1988:1-17] theories of utopia 
were given quite concise expression in their 1964 public discourse that was aired on radio 
in Baden-Baden, Germany. Adorno set the stage for their discourse on the ambiguity and 
contradictions of utopia by grounding the discussion concretely in the historical success 
of technology to realize particular utopian dreams of former times, e.g., T.V., space 
travel, moving faster than sound, the wish to fly, etc. It seems quite obvious that Adorno 
did this in order to prevent the discourse from becoming abstract and 
transcendental.  According to Adorno, by the realization of these particular dreams, their 
very best element – their future-oriented, utopian dynamic/spirit/purpose – is increasingly 
endangered of being forgotten and thus, lost.  This very real fear, of course, is grounded 
in the reality of the capitalist culture of consumption that systemically and ideologically 
reduces humanity’s utopian longing into a commodity fetishism that prioritizes “having” 
over “being” [Siebert, et al. 2013; Fromm 1976].  These realized utopian dreams have 
become nothing more than tiresome, positivistic facts produced by the success of modern 
science and technology. As such, these realized wishes become ideologically deceptive – 
producing a “false consciousness” – with regards to any utopian longing. The fulfillment 
of the wish takes something away from the future-oriented, “erotic” utopian vision and 
dynamic from which the wish began [Bloch 1988:1]. Such realized longings are emptied 
of their utopian dynamic of the hope for that which is other than what is. Civil society’s 
technological success in fulfilling a specific utopian wish reduces the critical substance 
and dynamic of utopian thought into being little more than a scientific/technological 
justification of bourgeois historicism’s concept of “progress.” Utopia and its hoped-for 
future strategically become absorbed into the static status quo, the eternal positivistic 
now, which transposes the dynamic, future oriented, hope-inspiring utopic dynamic of the 
“not-yet” into the progressive expectation for the given economic productive forces to 
provide consumers – today called “customers” not citizens – with the ever-new 
realization of such commodified dreams. This abstract, chronological notion of 
“progress” on a historical continuum into an empty and meaningless future quantitatively 
replaces the qualitative, utopic theory and praxis for a new, more humane, reconciled 
future society.  This loss of the dream, longing and hope for that which is “other” than 
what is the case is a consequence of the success of an instrumental rationality and logic 
made socially concrete by modern technology and a mass culture that lauds its ability to 
realize these specific utopian wishes. Adorno [1974:110] gave expression to this 
absorption of the cry and hope for utopic social transformation into the existing 
antagonistic social totality through the example of modern bread factories reducing 
Christianity’s “the Lord’s Prayer” for God to “give us this day our daily bread” [Matthew 
6:9-13] into mere poetry, which might edify the person saying the prayer while the 
horrific need of the poor for bread continues. Through the mass production of a staple of 
life, technology absorbs the religious utopic promise and hope of a new creation into the 
apparent success and continuing potential of the existing status quo. Utopic theory and 
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praxis for that which is “other” than what is becomes reduced to the flat-lined, 
ideological continuum of progress.  As Adorno asserts, this development becomes a 
strong argument against the possibility of Christianity and its eschatological hope, even 
more so than all the modern critiques of the life of Jesus [Horkheimer 1972:129-131; 
1974b]. 
Residue 
Bloch agreed with Adorno that technology has this type of effect on specific realizations 
of utopian wishes – it destroys them.  Yet, for Bloch [1986b:2ff], there always remains a 
still meaningful, utopian “residue” that falls outside of and is not fulfilled by such 
technological accomplishments. For Bloch, the historical movement toward a totally 
administered, cybernetic and dehumanized society had not yet been achieved. Although, 
as stated above, Adorno was much more skeptical than Bloch about the possibility of an 
alternative to civil society’s progressive transition to a totally administered system and 
world, his entire philosophy was nevertheless a negative dialectical critique of the falsity 
of Modernity’s historicist philosophy of history and its “unity principle,” which has been 
given its logical justification through a subjective identity philosophy that dualistically 
and thus, imperialistically privileges the authority of an abstract, isolated subject and its 
all-defining Concept in knowing and dominating objective reality. As Adorno stated in a 
1956 discourse with his friend, colleague, and the Director of the “Frankfurt School” 
Max Horkheimer, from within the ever-increasing “hell” of capitalist class domination 
and the “creative destruction” it produces in Western civilization and globally, a crisis 
that is ruthlessly yet “progressively” moving like a juggernaut into a positivistically 
conceived homogenous, empty future, their entire critical theory – as well as that of 
Walter Benjamin – could be described in the best possible way as a “Flaschenpost,” an 
emergency message in a bottle of social critique of the increasing crises, and hope for the 
creation of a more reconciled future global world [Adorno & Horkheimer 2011: chapt. 
10, esp. p. 100; Adorno 1974:209; Bloch 1989; Benjamin 1968: 253-264; 2003 IV:389-
411; 1999:101-119, 456-488, 651-670, 693-697, 698-739, 779-785, 787-795, 800-806; 
Marcuse 1964; Neumann 1942]. This message was not to be passed on to the masses or 
to powerless individuals, but “to an imaginary witness,” who one day might take 
responsibility for it so that it would not perish with its authors [Horkheimer and Adorno 
1972:256].  For both Adorno and Bloch, the objective world is heterogeneous, in terms of 
both nature and history, and thus epistemologically falls outside the definitional control 
and self-serving meaning of such class-interest driven, identity-creating concepts that 
seek in god-like ways to create the world in the bourgeoisie’s own image [Genesis 1-2; 
John 1:1-5; Colossians 1:15-17; Adorno 1973].  Since, as an expression of the “premature 
birth” or “pre-history” of humanity [Bloch 1976:3-4; Marx 1970, 1973; Benjamin 1968: 
253-264; 2003 IV:389-411], such concepts and the meaning and values they express are 
the intellectual reflection of the dominate class’s interests and the social system that is 
created to further those interests, it is this systematically marginalized, “non-identical” if 
not meaningless “other” that is the dynamic essence of dialectics and its methodology of 
determinate negation [Hegel 1967:67-1330, par. 118-130; 1991b:136-152; Adorno 1973: 





According to Bloch, every technological realization of utopian wishes or dreams, which 
can produce a disempowerment of further utopian thought and longing, also produces a 
utopian residue that continues to foment.  This residue exposes the negativity from within 
the identity system and is, as such, the footing for the revolutionary resistance and hope 
that can lead toward utopic social change.  For Bloch, the technological fulfillment of 
utopian wishes is very limited to particular “wish dreams.”  The critical question that 
needs to be asked is to what future do these dreams point?  Is it toward the ever-
increasing production of consumer commodities?  Toward newer, faster, bigger versions 
of what already is: cars, computers, I-pods, technological gadgets, airplanes that hold 
more cargo/people and are faster, global communications, military weapons, everything 
that increases the need for heightened security measures such as spy technology and 
centers, anti-immigration walls between nations – all expressions of the defensive and 
retaliatory jus or lex talionis?  Or, does the dominance of an instrumental reason and its 
technology keep the door open toward a more humane, just, rational, loving, merciful, 
hopeful, shalom-filled future society and world?  Although he doesn’t explain what is 
meant by this or what it will take for its realization, it is this later possibility that Bloch 
calls the “residue” of a capitalist society and its technological fulfillment of utopian 
wishes, a residue of that which is still not realized by the already existent economic, 
social, political, scientific, and technological means of production possibilities.  The 
residue is the “other” – this hope of a more reconciled future society – that is, for Bloch 
[1988:11-17], rooted in the intelechy of humanity unfolding its “being” toward what 
“should be.”   It is this “other,” this “residue” that is expressed in the Jewish foundational 
narrative and hope of the Exodus, which is anamnestically and proleptically to be 
remembered and to be personally identified with by the faithful [Deut. 25].  This 
“residue” of otherness is also the dominant and defiant substance and dynamic of the 
Golden Rule and the Sermon on the Mount – “So always treat others as you would like 
them to treat you; that is the meaning of the Law and the Prophets” [Matthew 7:12; 
Horkheimer 1985:390; Küng 1991c, 2000]; the same Law and Prophets that Jesus says he 
came not to cancel but to fulfill through his present prophetic and eschatological praxis 
[Matthew 5:17-18]; the very same Torah which calls Israel – God’s people, those who 
wrestle with God and humanity to bring about a more redeemed future and prevail [Gen. 
32] – to become a good nation – a light to the rest of the nations who will come to Israel 
to learn of its/god’s ways – in the hope of the coming of God’s Reign – the totally 
“Other” [Matthew 6:25-33; Bloch 1970b: 73-92, 111-117, 118-141; 1972a; 1986: I, II, 
III; Küng 1991c; 2000].  In this, utopia is not conceived of as a place but a living 
dialectical praxis through which the possibility of a more utopic society is created – ever 
created.  It is in this sense that the concept, theory, vision and praxis of utopia has not 
become meaningless or ridiculously unreal, as it has been defined defensively by modern 
civil society. 
Utopian Possibilities 
Bloch believed that the modern epoch lives much closer to the possible realization of 
utopia. According to Bloch, due to the power and capability of technology and science to 
realize some utopian dreams, the modern epoch may have elevated the possibility of 
utopian thought more than hinder it.  The modern translation of the notion of utopia into 
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technological possibilities and even into the genre of science fiction is not the end of 
utopia but keep the utopic other alive.  As an example of this, Bloch returned to the early 
development of utopic thinking from being envisioned in space to its transition of being 
in time. For Bloch, Thomas More’s conception of Utopia in space meant that the utopia 
was here now, but that I/we are not there.  However, in placing utopia into time meant 
that not only were we not in utopia, but also that utopia wasn’t here yet.  Placing the 
utopian into the future did not empty it of its meaning and critical purpose as though it 
did not and could not exist.  Utopia does not exist yet but depends on people living and 
working now to realize it in the future.  Bloch imaged this as the more we travel toward 
the future isle of utopia, the more it will arise from the sea of the possible – out of the 
present chaos, which the sea represents.  For Bloch, it is the ever-present residue and 
dynamic hope of utopia that can overcome the deadly rejection of the utopian longing for 
that which is other than what is and its justifying positivistic metaphysics of “progress” 
made real through specific technological creations of new commodities. Specific things 
may progressively be altered, even created and thus give the appearance of change and of 
the new, but the crushing, class dominated social totality and its system remains the same 
– increasingly the same. 
For Bloch, defiant utopian wishing, dreaming, visioning and consciousness, rooted in the 
nature of being human, has the critical, concrete capability of critiquing and transforming 
the existing social totality and its relations of production and power.  For the owners of 
the means of production – the capitalist class power-elite, such potential change of the 
social totality, which is constructed to serve their class profit motive, must be prevented 
at all costs.  It is for this reason that a critical, eschatological culture that transcends the 
boundary of the status quo is dangerous to the capitalist class domination of society. 
Paradise Lost 
Adorno’s critique of the contradiction between the capitalist class’s domination of the 
modern social totality and its scientific and technological potentials for overcoming the 
existing social antagonisms – the critically framed division between the owners and the 
means of production – expresses the difference between the two theorists concerning the 
possibility of utopia and its realization.  Because of the narrow, specific realization of 
utopian dreams by means of an instrumental rationality and technology, which are far too 
often the derivative of research done for “national security,” Adorno thinks that people 
have lost their utopian consciousness or imagination that the social totality itself could be 
something other than what it is.  Within this socially manufactured collapse of thinking 
for that which is “other” than what exists, particular changes within the existing status 
quo can be imagined if not hoped for, but not change of the status quo/social totality 
itself. Thinking in categories of the Absolute, universality, totality has been jettisoned 
ideologically as being the anachronistic, “Grand Narrative” metaphysics of 
totalitarianism or as that which cannot be scientifically analyzed and proven. This 
rejection of the philosophical category of totality is ideological since the globalization of 
neo-liberal capitalism through its various international structures, e.g., the World Trade 
Organization, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and its Structural 
Adjustment Programs, etc., as well as the political, cultural and military policies of its 
neoconservative hand-maid, is directed toward nothing but the totality of global 
domination. This systemic dummying down of human consciousness and knowledge, 
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particularly that of the working class, gives concrete expression to Marx’s [1976:91] 
warning of capitalism as being the deadly Medusa head that is veiled and thus, 
unknown.  Thus, there is little to no consciousness and knowledge of the reality of the 
capitalist “system” of globalizing domination, which thereby disembowels any thought of 
revolutionary praxis to change the dominant and manipulative power relations that 
determine the social totality.  It is this class dominated social totality of Western 
capitalism and its ideology producing “culture industry,” which has produced the 
“strange shrinking of the utopian consciousness,” that is the focus of Adorno [1988:3-4; 
1973; 2008, 1991a] negative theory of utopia. For the masses, ignorance, cynicism and 
apathy reign, as the system moves ineluctably toward its consummation in a totally 
administered, antagonistic social totality. 
It is Adorno’s thesis that deep down human beings feel or intuit that life and society 
could be different, that people’s needs could actually be satisfied and that they could be 
happy and free, both subjectively and objectively in solidarity.  However, according to 
Adorno [1988:4], “a wicked spell has been cast over the world” by an increasingly reified 
class system that prevents people from attaining such a universal utopian consciousness 
and thus, living for its realization.  This spell is the mystification or “aura” of capital and 
its fetish of commodification, which, along with a cultural and media industry that 
incessantly advertises and creates the idolatrous need for such things as being the 
fulfillment of life, causes people to reject any alternative to the existing status quo and to 
identify with their masters.  Adorno’s solution to overcoming this contradiction is for 
people to be compelled by this contradiction – to become critically conscious of this 
contradiction – in order to enter into the socio-historical struggle to determinately negate 
it; to identify themselves with the utopian “impossibility” and make it their own.  This 
ownership of the utopic impossible is the materialist expression for the religious faith 
commitment to a hope for that impossible “Other.” 
The Content of Utopia 
The fundamental difference between Adorno’s and Bloch’s theory of utopia is expressed 
clearly in the different paradigms they use to answer the question about the content of 
utopia.  Both Adorno and Bloch agree that the content of utopias is dependent on the 
existing social conditions and possibilities of its realization and that it is not comprised of 
one single, isolated category, i.e., happiness, freedom, etc. The objective, scientific, 
economic, technological, productive forces of the existing social totality must be taken 
into account in any discourse on the content of the utopian other as it is this socio-historic 
context that gives the meaning and purpose to all of the individual utopian categories. As 
Adorno [1988:3] states, “Whatever utopia is, whatever can be imagined as utopia, this is 
the transformation of the totality.” The consciousness of this possibility of the society’s 
transformation can only occur negatively, through the knowledge of the social totality as 
antagonistic. Thus, utopia is to be found in the determinate negation of the falseness, the 
negativity of what is, which thereby points through the negative to what should be, but is 
not guaranteed. In his final aphorism in his Minima Moralia entitled “Finale,” Adorno 
[1974:247] gave expression to this negative utopic endeavor. 
Here, Adorno materialistically inverts Judeo-Christian religious categories of redemption 
and “the Messianic light” as the dialectical lens through which to contemplate the 
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negativity of the social totality. The only truth that knowledge has to offer to the world is 
the redemptive/liberating determinate negation of the existing negativity.  Anything else 
isn’t an expression of real knowledge and its redemptive task of educating and thus, 
redemptively leading humanity out of its enslavement to the historical system of 
domination. From such negative, dialectical knowledge, alternative perspectives are to be 
created that expose the antagonisms of the existing social totality as they “will appear one 
day in the messianic light” [Adorno 1974:247]. Such perspectives are not just an issue of 
abstract theory construction, but are to be derived from “felt contact” with the reality of 
the antagonistic social totality.  This is the sole task of thought, which is not absolute but 
also conditioned by the negativity of the system of which it is a part.  This ever-present 
negativity, conditionality and thus, impossibility of an absolute knowledge has to be 
acknowledge for the sake of achieving the possible through the determinate negation of 
the existing negativity.  The wisdom and truth of utopia is manifested in the continuing, 
vigilant, historical act of negating the social conditions that destroy humanity and nature. 
Longing 
Also, for Bloch [1988:12, 5], “the essential function of utopia is a critique of what is 
present.” Although the utopic content changes depending on the social conditions of the 
time, the transcendental, humanistic longing for utopia remains the same.  For Bloch, 
that drive for the “other” than what exists is rooted in the historical becoming process of 
being human which is expressed as “longing;” “a longing that is the pervading and above 
all only honest quality of all human beings.” Unlike Adorno, for Bloch utopia is the goal 
of being human and is not completely endangered by the barbarism of history and its 
development toward a totally administered society. Unlike Adorno’s [1973, 1974, 2008, 
Adorno and Horkheimer 1972] assertion that history is moving toward the realization of a 
totally class-dominated, cybernetic, dehumanized future society and thus, toward the end 
of utopia, Bloch [1988:15] does not believe that utopia can be removed from history in 
spite of everything, since it is rooted in what it means to be and struggle for being human. 
The Social Totality 
For Adorno and Bloch, there is no one, singular utopian content.  The concept of utopia is 
not defined by the transformation of one particular category, such as happiness or 
freedom.  Each category of the existing social totality can change itself according to its 
own experience.  However, this reduction of the meaning of utopia to one, isolated 
category equates utopia to the subjective epistemic meaning and purpose of 
idealism.  The socio-historical context or totality, which connects all the categories, must 
be taken into account in any discourse on the content of utopia.  It is this socio-historical 
totality that gives the established meaning and purpose to all of the particular categories, 
be it in terms of the modern bourgeois and even reactionary post-modern social construct 
based on the paradigm of an isolated, monadic, ego-centric subject that stands against any 
and all “others” – the bellum omnium contra omnes, or a collectivist notion of humanity 
in solidarity expressed the mutual recognition of the “other” and objectified in the 
system’s economic productivity and humanistic distribution of wealth and 
power.  Particularly, in the later expression of a socialistic social totality, the 
transformation of a one utopic category, e.g. happiness, freedom, equality, justice, etc., 
would necessitate a change in the other categories, which no longer stand in isolation 
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from each other as subjective ends in-themselves, but fulfills itself in terms of the newly 
created social context. 
Death 
However, for Adorno and Bloch, the crucial and determining issue for utopian thinking is 
the elimination of death, which also necessitates the elimination of the jus/lex talionis – 
the law of retaliation and revenge [Exodus 21:23-27; Qur’an 2:178-179, 16:126].  Within 
the given modern antagonistic social totality, the elimination of death is considered to be 
the most horrific thing possible for a necrophilic globalizing social totality. Even the 
suggestion of the utopic elimination of death threatens the very existence of an 
antagonistic social totality that produces and reproduces itself by means of death.  The 
theory and praxis for a more reconciled future society is the enemy of every system of 
domination and it must be abolished.  The social totality’s identification with death, 
which produces the same hopeless identification in the oppressed social classes, is a 
reality that once was religiously called “evil.” Yet, there is no secular term that can 
replace the word “evil” in expressing the depth and breadth of the horror created by the 
capitalist social totality and its globalization. 
The biophilic, utopian consciousness is one that contains nothing horrific about death as 
it holds out the possibility that people no longer have to die, or suffer, fear, be or become 
defensive, despairing, hopeless, etc.  However, this biophilic utopian consciousness is at 
present trumped by the absolute anti-utopia that sanctifies and makes death absolute. 
Although there is no one category that alone can realize the utopian consciousness and 
longing, the elimination of death is the most important dynamic purpose of utopian 
theory and praxis.  For Bloch and Adorno, the fear of death is the fundamental root of 
utopian thought.  This was expressed in the scientific, utopic pursuit of medicine as well 
as religion in their attempts to combat the power of death and ultimately conquer it. 
Particularly, Christianity proclaims the ultimate victory over death with the proclamation 
of the resurrection of Jesus from the dead.  The elimination of death and the fear of it, 
thus setting people free from the “final enemy” [1 Corinthians 15:26; Revelation 21:4] is 
proclaimed throughout the eschatology of the New Testament and particularly in the 
Sermon on the Mount [Matthew 5-7; Luke 6:20-49] – the prophetic and Messianic 
proclamation, vision, dynamic longing that inspires concrete social praxis of/for a good, 
just, reconciled future without death and its consequences. 
Faith 
According to Bloch [1988:9-10], there are two parts to utopian thought: social utopias – 
construction of social totalities in which there are no exploited and dominated human 
beings, and natural law – in which there are no degraded, humiliated people.  To this, 
Bloch adds death itself and the transcendental element of faith as the third component of 
utopian theory and praxis; faith in the elimination of death; faith as the victory over death 
that humanity cannot do for its self. For this, a transcendental “Other” is needed.  “So we 
need the help of baptism, Christ’s death, and resurrection” [Bloch: 1988:10].  Faith in a 
totally “Other,” which can negate the final enemy, the anti-utopia of death and its power 
of fear, dialectically belongs to utopia while it also transcends it. 
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Adorno agrees with Bloch that without a faith in that which is totally “Other” than what 
is, without the notion of a life freed from death and everything connected with it, which is 
not solely an issue of science, the very idea of utopia cannot be thought. Where the idea, 
threshold, reality, antinomy and aporia of death is not considered, then there can be no 
utopian thought or praxis as the resistance against it.  Thus, particularly for Adorno, 
because of the existential, social and historical reality of death, the very content of utopia 
cannot be imaged in a positive but only negative dialectical manner. As in all things, 
Adorno applies the very same prohibition of the second and third commandment of the 
Jewish Decalogue against naming or imaging positively the Absolute, the totally “Other,” 
to any consideration of utopia.  Only that which utopia is not can be stated.  According to 
Adorno, the horrific reality of death is the metaphysical reason why utopia cannot be 
spoken about in a positive but only a negative manner. For Adorno [1988:10], utopia can 
only be expressed as the struggle to determinately negate the negativity of an antagonistic 
social totality that operates through the power, system, and structures of death.  Utopia 
thereby includes and yet goes beyond death, as death is “nothing other than the power of 
that which merely is” [Bloch 1988:10]. Thus, for the sake of the continuing 
consciousness of and historical struggle for the possibility of utopia, nothing can be 
imaged, named, or known of utopia, as it is the struggle itself. 
Bloch’s theory agrees with Adorno’s negative dialectical critique and revolutionary 
rebellion against every social system of domination. Yet, Adorno warns that the voices of 
utopic longing must always be on guard against compromised, patchwork solutions or of 
becoming satisfied with progress in addressing the powers of death, which creates a false 
consciousness of being victorious in the struggle with the socio-historical manifestations 
of death that, as a social totality, remain in power. One cannot negotiate with the devil. 
The negative dialectical, eschatological critique against all systems of domination and 
oppression, against that which should not be, in terms of the secular if not also religious 
longing and struggle for the utopia of the elimination of the socio-historical powers of 
death must be kept alive. This is done through attaining in solidarity with others the 
undaunted commitment to this negative utopian consciousness of transcendence for that 
which is historically beyond what is, that keeps the life-giving longing for that 
other/“Other” dynamically and concretely alive in terms of both theory and praxis. While 
Adorno focuses on the determinate negation of the specific negatives of humanity’s and 
nature’s destruction in a social system moving toward its consummation in a totally 
administered, class dominated society as the dynamic of utopia, Bloch, nevertheless 
presents his theory of utopia in a transcendental optimism for the ultimate, revolutionary 
overthrow of the social totalities of death. 
Something’s Missing 
In their discourse, Bloch quoted the lumberjack character Paul Ackermann from Brecht’s 
[2010:19-21, Scene Eight] City of Mahagonny, who proclaims, “something’s missing” in 
Mahagonny, which was suppose to be a capitalist paradise. 
Jake: Paul, why are you running away? 
Paul: Well, what is there to keep me here? 
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Harry: Why are you pulling your face like that? 
Paul: I could not help seeing a notice 
On which was the word: ‘Forbidden’. 
Joe: Haven’t you got gin and cheep whiskey? 
Paul: They’re too cheap! 
Harry: And peace and concord? 
Paul: It’s too peaceful! 
Jake: If you feel like eating fish 
You can go and catch one. 
Paul: That won’t make me happy. 
Joe: You can smoke. 
Paul: You can smoke. 
Harry: You can nod off. 
Paul: You can sleep. 
Jake: You can swim. 
Paul: You can pick a banana! 
Joe: You can look at the water. 
Paul just shrugs his shoulders. 
Harry: You can forget. 
Paul: But something is missing. 
Jake, Harry, Joe: Wonderful is the approach of eventide 
And delightful are men’s intimate conversations! 
Paul: But something is missing. 
Jake, Harry, Joe: Delightful is the peace and quiet 
And congenial is the concord. 
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Paul: But something is missing. 
Jake, Harry, Joe: Quite splendid is the simple life 
And beyond compare are the wonders of nature. 
Paul: But something is missing. 
I think that I just want to eat my hat 
I think that will fill me right up. 
Why ever should you not just eat up your hat 
If you’ve nothing, if you’ve nothing, if you’ve nothing else to do? 
You’ve mixed a different cocktail every day 
You’ve seen the moon shine down the whole night through. 
They’ve closed the bar, the bar of Mandalay 
And still nothing has come to pass. 
My God, boys, and still nothing has come to pass. 
According to Bloch [1988:15], this phrase that something is missing in the “paradise” of 
Mahagonny (capitalism) was one of the most profound and truthful statements ever 
penned by Brecht. The excerpt above expresses the dehumanizing deadness of capitalism 
that at best treats people as livestock: providing them diversionary and mindless 
entertainment, as they are lead daily to the slaughterhouse.  The productive system of 
capitalism remains hidden, while the working class decays with no work, no meaning, no 
happiness, no life, and no future. For Adorno, Brecht’s statement gives expression to his 
thought that people are conscious that life could really be different than the way it 
presently is.  It could be just.  It could be peaceful.  It could be reconciled and happy. 
People are conscious, “deep down,” that what is missing is utopia, a concrete socio-
historical utopia. The truth and purpose of utopia is to negate the conditions that turn 
human beings and nature into nothing but reified objects, whose spirit and life is reduced 
systemically to nothing. Bloch [1988:15] too critiques this horror by quoting an old 
peasant proverb, “There is no dance before the meal.”  Until people have their immediate 
needs fulfilled, there is no dancing, no play.  “Only when all the guests have sat down at 
the table can the Messiah, can Christ come.” Bloch’s and Adorno’s friend, Walter 
Benjamin [1968:254-255; 1978:312-313; Matthew 7:33] expressed the same materialist 
inversion of Jesus’ teaching in the demand that the concrete needs of people for food, 
water, clothing, shelter, and happiness must be met first, whereupon the kingdom of God 
will then be added to you.  In terms of historical materialism, utopia has to be taken out 
of the clouds so as to address the unjust material conditions of the present to become a 
force of socio-historical critique of the necrophilia of modernity and of revolutionary 
change. In this sense, for Bloch, Marxism itself is only a precondition for utopia – not 
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utopia itself.  Marxism is that which allows all people to the table, that which seeks to 
meet the human needs of all people.  It sets the stage for the beginning of a human history 
and life in freedom, happiness, possible fulfillment, creativity and content – beyond that 
of mere necessity. 
Again, at the end of their discourse, Adorno expressed the concrete difference between 
Bloch’s transcendental approach to historical materialism’s utopic critique of capitalism 
and his own negative dialectics of determinate negation as utopia.  Adorno critiqued 
Bloch’s use and explanation of Brecht’s statement of “something is missing” as coming 
strangely close to St. Anselm of Canterbury’s [1962] ontological proof of God. To say 
that something’s missing means that the seeds, the incipient foment of that something is 
already present, without which no one would know that it is missing.  The concept of 
God or utopia already contain the elements of the utopic reality that is missing, and it is 
from this knowledge and experience that utopia can be realized.  Without this 
eschatological dynamic, no notion of utopia or of thinking itself would be possible. For 
Adorno [1992b:200-215], Bloch’s transcendental materialist theory is entirely too 
optimistic that such change can and will ultimately happen.  For Adorno [1992b:209, 
211], Bloch is a mystic in the paradoxical way in which he unites theology and atheism. 
Bloch’s theory of utopia is a materialist metaphysics that naively constructs the 
theological notion of transcendence into the profane realm of history, which thereby turns 
philosophy back into idealism, into a “phenomenology of the imaginary.”  The 
oppressive and deadly reality and power of the increasing negativity of capitalism – and 
of all authoritarian systems of domination – is acknowledged but transcendentally and 
thus, logically glossed over in the hope filled struggle of its negation.  For Adorno, it is 
the seriousness of suffering and death itself that is the horrifying power and reality of 
capitalism as a globalizing juggernaut moving toward its consummation in the iron cage 
of a totally administered, prison society that is missing in Bloch’s theory of utopia. 
Hope 
Of course the difference between Bloch and Adorno must not be reduced into a dualistic, 
zero-sum equation.  Bloch, as Adorno, was a dialectical philosopher of historical 
materialism, deeply grounded in Hegelian dialectics and Marx’s revolutionary critique of 
capitalism.  He knew of capitalism’s negativity and power.  He also knew of the 
historical expressions of revolutionary resistance against all systems of domination, 
especially that of Judaism and Christianity, the alternatives presented in aesthetics, as 
well as of the French, Russian, and even Weimar revolutions. For Bloch, the systems of 
death are to be critiqued, resisted, and negated by the theoretical and practical power or 
“principle” of hope.  For Bloch, hope is concerned with and envisions perfection. 
Max Horkheimer [1972:129-131] addressed the issue of perfection as an anachronistic 
illusion that has been carried over into modern social practice from the religious longing 
of the past.  For Horkheimer, the realization of perfection in reality is impossible, for 
even if a better society is created that negates the negativity of the given society, it still 
will be impossible to rectify or redeem the suffering of the past’s innocent victims in 
history or nature.  The transition of the religious longing to transcend the horror of the 
present into the modern “impotent [conceptual] revolt against reality” is part of 
humanity’s historical development.  However, as Horkheimer states, what differentiates a 
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progressive person from a retrogressive one is not the refusal of the idea of 
transcendence, but the understanding of the historical limits to its fulfillment.  For 
Horkheimer and Adorno, the concern for perfection is a “vain hope.” 
Yet, for Bloch, the critique of that which is imperfect, incomplete, and should not be so 
contains within itself the conception of and longing for the possibility of perfection.  For 
Bloch, perfection is understood to be the rebellious possibility of the negation of the 
present negativity.  Bloch [1998:14] gives expression to his defiant hope in the words of 
the 19th century German novelist, Wilhelm Raabe: “illusions are necessary, have become 
necessary for life in a world completely devoid of a utopian conscience and utopian 
presentiment …” It is precisely in this glorification of the idealistic “lie,” from the 
perspective of Adorno’s negative dialectic theory, that Bloch becomes overly hopeful if 
not dangerously illusionary.  The determinate negation of negativity does not produce the 
possibility of perfection.  The negation has possibly overcome a specific form of the 
social totality’s negativity, which, as history shows, is often recreated into another, more 
strategically “rationalized” form of cybernetic of negativity. Nevertheless, for Bloch 
[1972:264], hope is “the unassuaged, explosive hunger of the life-force, [that] presents 
itself as the continual Not-yet of true human possession.” It is from this hunger and hope 
for that which is other than what is that feeds and empowers people to live and work for 
utopia.  According to Bloch [1972:264-265], it is from this defiant, hope-filled work for 
utopia that “the radical, subversive dream of the Bible” for the future, “to the great 
dimension of light with which the world is pregnant” comes into being. Hope is not 
confidence of that for which it hopes as it is well aware of its being surrounded by the 
power of negativity.  Hope can be thwarted, but for Bloch [1999:16-17], that does not 
mean it is defeated.  Even in the midst of its decline and disappointment, hope still nails a 
flag on the sinking ship’s mast, for the decline is not accepted. For the hunger of hope is 
“an irrepressible sense of the awakening of meaning,” and, as such, true hope is an 
expression of never ending defiance against all odds for the Not-yet-being, whose 
ultimate realization will be the beginning of the true Utopia. 
Conclusion 
Both Adorno and Bloch fought tirelessly to overcome the “wicked spell” of capitalism 
and of its epistemological mythology of positivism.  Nevertheless, this authoritarian 
system of death has continued to spread across the globe, destructively creating it in its 
own deadly imperialistic image. Although their historical materialist methodologies and 
theories of utopia differed, this system was theirs and our common enemy.  Their theories 
are indeed “Flaschenpost” – notes in a bottle cast into the sea of chaos in the hope that 
they would be found, understood and taken responsibility for by people in the future. 
Bloch and Adorno’s theories of utopia, although fundamentally different, need to be 
determinately negated and thus critically revived in the 21st century to help in the present 
day fight against the much further developed anti-utopian, capitalist system of 
domination and its deadly threat not only to the present but also to the past and to the 
future.  Through such committed and continuing work on their dialectical materialist 
theories of society and religion – particularly, by the religions and by academia – against 
the progressive collapse of modernity into the positivistic reproduction of hell, the 





[1] For example, see The National Security Strategy of the United States of America 2002 & 
2010, 
[http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/national_security_strategy.pdf.], 
as well as the text of the U.S. President Barak Obama’s UN General Assembly speech on 
September 24, 2013[http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/25/us/politics/text-of-obamas-
speech-at-the-un.html?_r=0] 
[2] John Stuart Mill is credited with coining these terms in an 1868 speech before the 
British House of Commons in which he along with others denounced the British 
government’s Irish land policy. Among the numerous dystopia novels published since the 
beginning of the 20th century, the Critical Theorist Erich Fromm [1949:259 ftnt.] 
identified Jack London’s prediction of fascism in the United States in his 1908 published 
The Iron Heel as the first, modern negative utopia. 
[3] See the biblical covenant calls to faith through which the faithful’s identity and future 
are open to the future in the dynamic relationship with their God: Abram [Genesis 12:1-
9]; Moses and the Hebrews in the Exodus [19:3-8]; Jesus’ call to discipleship [Mark 
8:34-9:1]. 
[4] This proverb was expressed by Hegel as a harsh critique of his former friend and 
colleague F.W.J Schelling’s Romantic Philosophy of Nature, in which all particularity is 
subsumed abstractly and thus, in an unmediated way into the equally abstract and dark 
Absolute Idea. As will be shown below, Habermas [1983:61-77] critiques Bloch’s 
philosophy in similar terms, by calling Bloch a “Marxist Schelling.” 
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